Modalna epistemologija i ekspanatorni jaz : značaj argumenta na osnovu zamislivosti zombija

Abstract

Cilj ovog rada je da se odgovori na sledeće pitanje: na koji način argument na osnovu zamislivosti zombija utiče na rešavanje problema ekplanatornog jaza u filozofiji duha? Odgovor na ovo pitanje je sledeći: argument na osnovu zamislivosti zombija je validan i zdrav, i ostavlja problem eksplanatornog jaza, i još više, problem ontološkog jaza izmeĎu fizičkog i mentalnog, nerešenim. U ovom radu se nude novi argumenti koji ovoj tezi idu u prilog. Argument na osnovu zamislivosti zombija instanca je argumenta na osnovu zamislivosti, kojim se bavi modalna epistemologija, i u kome se iz zamislivosti zombija (našeg fizičkog dvojnika koji, za razliku od nas, ne poseduje subjektivna svesna iskustva) izvodi da je metafizički moguće da takva bića postoje. Ovim argumentom se dovodi u pitanje fizikalizam u filozofiji duha, kojim se tvrdi da je čitava stvarnost fizičke prirode (u smislu da je fizičko dovoljan uslov za mentalno) i/ili da je potpuni fizički opis univerzuma dovoljan za objašnjenje celokupne prirode univerzuma. S obzirom na to da je Dejvid Čalmers ponudio najrazvijeniju verziju argumenta na osnovu zamislivosti zombija, koja je i danas predmet velikih diskusija meĎu filozofima, u ovom radu se vrši detaljna egzegeza njegove verzije argumenta. Posebna pažnja se pridaje prigovorima koje mnogi filozofi upućuju Čalmersovom argumentu, a na koje sam Čalmers nije odgovorio ili, po mišljenju autora, nije odgovorio na zadovoljavajući način. Fizikalisti na različite načine pokušavaju da ospore argument na osnovu zamislivosti zombija...

The aim of this thesis is to answer to the following question: how the zombie argument affects explanatory gap problem in philosophy of mind? Author gives the following answer: the zombie argument is valid and sound, and it leaves the explanatory gap problem (and, moreover ontological gap problem) unsolved. The author provides new arguments that support this way of thinking. The zombie argument is an instance of the conceivability argument in modal epistemology, which starts with a premise that zombies (our physical duplicates, who unlike us lack phenomenal consciousness) are conceivable, and concludes that zombies are metaphysically possible. The argument challenges physicalism in philosophy of mind, a view according to which everything is physical (in the sense that the physical is a sufficient condition for the mental), and/or a complete physical description of the universe suffices in explaining its nature. Physicalists deal with the zombie argument in various ways. Some of them think that zombies are not conceivable in any relevant sense; others think that conceivability does not entail metaphysical possibility; there are also physicalists who are willing to redefine their view in a way which avoids consequences of the zombie argument. In this thesis, all these attempts are assessed, and it is shown that they are not capable of rejecting the zombie argument. Bearing in mind that David Chalmers offers the most elaborated version of the zombie argument, which is still in a great focus among philosophers, the author provides a detail exegesis of Chalmers’ argument. Special attention is given to objections to which Chalmers has not provided an answer or, according to the author’s opinion, he has not answered successfully...