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Epistemic justification of democracy

dc.contributor.advisorStupar, Milorad
dc.contributor.otherMladenović, Ivan
dc.contributor.otherPavićević, Đorđe
dc.creatorJanković, Ivana
dc.date.accessioned2018-09-12T08:46:59Z
dc.date.available2018-09-12T08:46:59Z
dc.date.available2020-07-03T09:55:34Z
dc.date.issued2018-06-08
dc.identifier.urihttp://nardus.mpn.gov.rs/handle/123456789/9847
dc.identifier.urihttp://eteze.bg.ac.rs/application/showtheses?thesesId=5950
dc.identifier.urihttps://fedorabg.bg.ac.rs/fedora/get/o:18121/bdef:Content/download
dc.identifier.urihttp://vbs.rs/scripts/cobiss?command=DISPLAY&base=70036&RID=50362895
dc.description.abstractCilj ove doktorske disertacije jeste da pruži argumente u prilog epistemičkog opravdanja demokratije. Tvrdićemo da zbog toga što čisto proceduralno opravdanje definiše autoritet i legitimnost demokratije samo u odnosu na pravičnost same procedure, ono ne može biti adekvatno objašnjenje za sve ono do čega nam je u demokratiji istinski stalo. Ljudima je u demokratiji veoma važan i sam ishod demokratskog procesa. Legitimost demokratske procedure, dakle, zavisi i od kvaliteta odluka koje ta procedura proizvodi. Uspon epistemičkih teorija o demokratiji je u skladu sa porastom popularnosti ideje o „mudrosti gomile“ koju pronalazimo u različitim oblastima istraživanja. Zbog toga ćemo se osvrnuti na razvoj i rezultate organizacione teorije i predstaviti psihološke nalaze o kapacitetima ljudskog rasuđivanja. Instrumentalne ili epistemičke teorije tvrde da je demokratija legitimna ako i samo ako ima tendenciju da nas dovede do „dobrih“ ili „istinitih“ političkih odluka. Tvrdićemo da ono što omogućava da demokratsko odlučivanje, pod određenim uslovima, ima veću epistemičku vrednost od alternativnih formi odlučivanja jeste postojanje kognitivne raznovrsnosti unutar grupe koja donosi političke odluke. Pružićemo teorijske i empirijske argumente u prilog epistemičke vrednosti kolektivnog, demokratkog donošenja odluka. Ukazaćemo na značaj političkih institucija koje mogu da omoguće prisustvo kognitivne raznovrsnosti i povećaju nivo pojedinačne kompetencije opšte javnosti. Takođe ćemo tvrditi da je neophodno kombinovati deliberativnu i agregativnu metodu, i to upravo tim redosledom, s obzirom da i jedna i druga imaju važne epistemičke karakteristike.sr
dc.description.abstractThe aim of this doctoral dissertation is to provide arguments in support of the epistemic justification of democracy. We will argue that because a purely procedural justification defines the authority and legitimacy of democracy only in relation to the fairness of the procedure itself, it can not be an adequate explanation for all the things we really care about in democracy. The outcome of the democratic process itself is very important to people in democracy. The legitimacy of a democratic procedure, therefore, depends on the quality of the decisions that this procedure produces. The rise of epistemic theories about democracy is in line with the increasing popularity of the idea of the "wisdom of the crowds" that we find in various fields of research. Therefore, we will look at the development and results of organizational theory and present psychological findings about human reasoning capacities. Instrumental or epistemic theories claim that democracy is legitimate if and only if it has a tendency to lead us to "good" or "true" political decisions. We will argue that what allows democratic decision-making, under certain conditions, to have a higher epistemic value than alternative forms of decision-making is the existence of the cognitive diversity of a group that makes political decisions. We will provide theoretical and empirical arguments in favor of the epistemic value of collective, democratic decision-making. We will point out the importance of political institutions that can enable the presence of cognitive diversity and increase the level of individual competence of the general public. We will also argue that it is necessary to combine a deliberative and aggregative method, precisely in this order, given that both of them have important epistemic characteristics.en
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.languagesr
dc.publisherУниверзитет у Београду, Филозофски факултетsr
dc.rightsopenAccessen
dc.sourceУниверзитет у Београдуsr
dc.subjectepistemička demokratijasr
dc.subjectepistemic democracyen
dc.subjectwisdom of crowdsen
dc.subjectcognitive diversityen
dc.subjectbounded rationalityen
dc.subjectdeliberative democracyen
dc.subjectaggregative democracyen
dc.subjectmudrost gomilesr
dc.subjectkognitivna raznovrsnostsr
dc.subjectograničena racionalnostsr
dc.subjectdeliberativna demokratijasr
dc.subjectagregativna demokratijasr
dc.titleEpistemičko opravdanje demokratijesr
dc.title.alternativeEpistemic justification of democracyen
dc.typedoctoralThesis
dc.rights.licenseARR
dcterms.abstractСтупар, Милорад; Павићевић, Ђорђе; Младеновић, Иван; Јанковић, Ивана; Епистемичко оправдање демократије; Епистемичко оправдање демократије;
dc.identifier.fulltexthttp://nardus.mpn.gov.rs/bitstream/id/25889/Disertacija.pdf
dc.identifier.fulltexthttp://nardus.mpn.gov.rs/bitstream/id/25890/IzvestajKomisije17516.pdf


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