Појединац и заједница у Кјеркегоровој мисли
The individual and community in Kierkegaard's thought
Committee membersMladenović, Ivan
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У раду смо поставили два главна циља: укључити се у дебату која се води око значаја појма заједнице у Кјеркегоровом делу, при чему заступамо тезу да заједница има конститутивни значај за формирање сопства, и изложити типологију односа појединца и заједнице на основу његових псеудонимних дела...
The paper has two main goals: to engage in an existing debate concerning the importance of community in Kierkegaard's work, by proposing that community has a constitutive role in formation of the self, and to expound a typology of relations between the individual and community based on Kierkegaard's pseudonymous authorship. To do that, we will start with the conception of community that can be found in Kierkegaard's works. Since Kierkegaard does not use the term „community“ as a technical term, we will use Habermas's and Matuštik's interpretation and critique of Kierkegaard as a conceptual framework. Theories of community proposed by Jean-Luc Nancy and Ferdinand Tönnies will serve to draw a line between Kierkegaard's conception of community and postmodernistic or antimodernistic conceptions. After that, we will deal with the concept of the individual, presented through the concept of the self, that has its most elaborate description in The Sickness Unto Death. By elaborating the aspect...s of the self and forms of despair based on them, we will provide the other part of the conceptual framework needed for our analysis. Following Theunissen's suggestion that forms of despair that Kierkegaard talks about actually represent stages of a process through which the individual alienates himself from his own self, we will identify various forms of despair in individuals in various existential spheres, and point to how these individuals perceive community and participate in it (if they are capable of doing that). After setting the conceptual framework, we will turn to the interpretation of the pseudonymous works. The first step in our interpretation is the analysis of the esthetic mode of existence. The basic question we will try to answer is: can there be a community of esthetic individuals? By positioning individuals that Kierkegaard describes in this existence sphere (Don Juan, Johannes Seducer, modern Antigone,...) within the context provided by the previous chapters, we will show that the aesthetic mode of existence is parasitic, passive or unrealizible, and therefore cannot serve as a principle upon which a sustainable community could be formed. Dealing with the ethical mode of existence, we will consider forms of despair that are possible on that stage, as well as two basic topics that Kierkegaard's pseudonymous authors deal with: choice of the self as a principle of action and justification, and marriage as a paradigm of community. The self is for the first time capable of forming a community based on the principles that itself exists upon: marriage, friendship, state, mankind. However, it still despairs. Although it accepts all aspects of its own self, it sees the „power that posited it“ only as a reflection of itself. The ethical self wants to be self-sufficient, desperately wants to be itself, to that point that it doesn't see the difference between its own stance and the religious one, that claims that in relation to God, we are always in the wrong. We will turn our attention to MacIntyre's thesis that „either/or“ is an insoluble choice between incommensurable positions of the aesthetic and the ethical individual. The relativity of the ethical position will be demonstrated in the chapted about the religious individual, where lines will be drawn between religiosity A and religiosity B, considered by Kierkegaard to be the only true religiosity, and presented through the character of Abraham. Religiosity A consists in projecting the ethical plane into the transcendent realm. In other words, this is the position of the ethical individual seen through the perspective of a „humorist“, i.e. an individual located between the ethical and the religious. Christian faith would belong to the second type of religiosity – paradoxal religiosity or religiosity B, characterized by accepting that the object of faith is inaccessible to knowledge. After that, we will present and criticize Merold Westphall's thesis that there exists a third type of religiosity in Kierkegaard – religiosity C. In the interlude, we will present some feminist interpretations of Kierkegaard, i.e. the place of women in his thought. We will show that his position need not be understood as misogynic; it can be seen also as an enticement to emancipation, albeit an individual emancipation of a woman (being that this is the only type of emancipation that Kierkegaard believes in). Using the examples of Thomasine Gyllembourg, Johanna Haiberg and Virgin Mary, we will point to the respect Kierkegaard has for women as individuals that have managed to realize their projects in spite of patriarchal communities they lived in. We will confront the standard feminist interpretaions that see Kierkegaard's philosophy as patriarchal and misogynous, using the defense provided by Wanda Warren Berry, and further confirm that defense with an analysis of Kierkegaard's Crisis in the Life of an Actress, a work standardly overlooked by feminist interpretations, as well as Waren Berry. After the interlude, we return to the analysis of later Kierkegaard's works, dealing with the topic of Christian love as the foundation of all forms of community. We will show the characteristics of the love for the neighbour, Kierkegaard's critique of preferential love, as well as the fact that the love for the neighbour does not exclude forma of preferential love, but only transforms and enobles them. Love towards God is realized in this world only as love towards neighbours. If our anaylises are correct, the community should play a crucial role in formation of the self in all spheres of existence. Even after the self is constituted, community os not like the Wittgensteinian ladder that we can throw away. Although from the perspective of Kierkegaard's probably most famous work, Fear and Trembling, it may seem that the authentic self is doomed to live in isolation, and incomprehensible to others, the remainder of Kierkegaard's works provide a context from which a non-antisocial interpretation is quite plausible. In the final chapter, we will, in addition to the summary of out investigation, provide opposed interpretations of the character of the complete work of Kierkegaard, provided by Bruce Kirmmse and Michael Tilley, and show that we can comprehend the significance of Kierkegaard's work only if we consider is at entirely polemical.