Performativi i refleksivna komunikacijska namera

Abstract

U doktorskoj disertaciji ispitujemo da li je Ostinovo (John L. Austin) odbacivanje distinkcije performativ/konstativ opravdano. Glavni razlog za odbacivanje ove distinkcije Ostin je video u tome što se, s jedne strane, procena konstativa u terminima istinitosti/lažnosti može proširiti i na performative, dok se, sa druge strane, procena performativa u terminima uspešnosti, prikladnosti i sl., može primeniti i na konstative. Zbog toga se Ostin okreće analizi govornih činova uopšte, koji se međusobno razlikuju po takozvanoj ilokucionoj snazi. Složićemo se sa Ostinovim relativizovanjem distinkcije performativ/konstativ, ali ne i sa proširenjem primene kriterijuma istinitosti. Kvalifikacija uspešno/neuspešno se može primeniti na konstative, posmatrane kao vrstu performativa, dok se kvalifikacija istinito/lažno ne može primeniti na ostale vrste performativa. Dok se kvalifikacija istinito/lažno odnosi na iskaze, distinkcija uspešno/neuspešno odnosi se na govorne činove. U prvom poglavlju određujemo distinkciju performativ/konstativ odvojivši implicitne od eksplicitnih performativa, i izlažemo Ostinove uslove za uspešne performative, kao i Ostinovu klasifikaciju ilokucionih snaga. Ostin razlikuje pet vrsta ilokucionih snaga i to: verdiktive, egzercitive, komisive, behabitive i ekspozitive. Ne slažemo se sa Ostinom da se verdiktivi i egzercitivi mogu odnositi samo na sudije i službena lica, i dajemo primere u kojima se oni primenjuju i na druge osobe. Verdiktive i egzercitive delimo na jake i slabe: prvi se tiču službenih a drugi neslužbenih lica. Takođe uvodimo tri nova konteksta u kojima se egzercitivi javljaju (§ 1.5). U drugom poglavlju ispitujemo ulogu namere u procesu komunikacije, vrste namera i refleksivnu komunikacijsku nameru. Polazeći od pretpostavke da je za uspešan proces komunikacije neophodno prepoznavanje značenja izricanja, ispitujemo neke od različitih stanovišta kako bismo došli do odgovora na pitanje: Kako određujemo značenje izricanja? Tako u drugom poglavlju (§ 2.1) objašnjavamo pojmove „Ono što je rečeno“ i „Ono što je implicirano“, u § 2.2 značenje Grajsovog pojma refleksivne namere i u § 2.2.1. Serlov prigovor Grajsovom određenju refleksivne komunikacijske namere. Serl smatra da se govornikovo značenje odnosi na nameru da se kod slušaoca proizvede izvestan efekat, a kod slušaoca je razumevanje izricanja povezano sa prepoznavanjem te namere. On prigovara Grajsu da ne dovodi u vezu prepoznavanje namere sa razumevanjem. Ne slažemo se sa Serlovim prigovorom pozivajući se na shemu 1 (str. 43), koja pokazuje da se značenje izricanja razume putem prepoznavanja namere i razumevanja govornikovog značenja. Pojmu namere pristupamo iz ugla sledećih teorija: filozofske pragmatike (Grajs, Rekanati), teorije relevancije (Sperber i Vilsonova) i lingvističke komunikacije (Kent Bah). Nalazimo da je Bahova referencijalna namera slična Grajsovoj refleksivnoj nameri. Referencijalna namera deo je komunikacijske namere...

This dissertation examines whether John Austin′s rejection of the performative/constative distinction is justified. He rejects this distinction because, on the one hand, he believes that the evaluation of constatives in terms of trutfullness can be extended to performatives, and that the evaluation of performatives in terms of happy/unhappy distinction can be extended to constatives, on the other. For these reasons, he turns to providing an analysis of illocutionary acts in general, which can be distinguished by the so called “illocutionary force”. In the dissertation, Austin′s relativization of the performative/constative distinction is accepted, while his extension of the criterion of truthfullness to performatives is questioned. The happy/unhappy qualification can be applied to constatives, when considered as performatives, but the true/false qualificaton cannot be applied to other kinds of performatives. While the true/false qualification is related to propositions, the happy/unhappy distinction is related to speech acts. In the first chapter, we define the performatives/constatives distinction distinguishes implicit from explicit performatives, and put forward Austin′s conditions for happy performatives, as well as Austin′s classification of illocutionary forces. Austin distinguishes between five classes of illocutionary forces: verdictives, egzercitives, commissives, behabitives and expositives. We do not accept Austin′s claim according to which verdictives and egzercitives rely only on judges and official persons, and gives examples in which verdictives and egzercitives are applied to other persons. We distinguishe between strong and weak readings of verdictives and egzercitives: the former are meant for official persons, while the latter are meant for unofficial persons. In the second chapter, the role of intention in the process of communication, as well as the kinds of intention and reflexive communicative intention are analyzed. The analysis starts off with a supposition that for a successful process of communication we have to recognize the meaning of an utterance. The chapter proceeds by exploring some different views on how to determine the meaning of an utterance. In this chapter, the key notions that are relevant for this work are laid out. For example, “What is said” and “What is implicated” phrases are explained in the § 2.1. Grice′s notion of reflexive communicative intention is spelled out in the § 2.2, while in the § 2.2.1. Searle′s objection to Grice′s definition of reflexive communicative intention is presented. Searle claims that the speaker′s meaning is related to an intention in order to produce effects to a hearer, while the hearer’s understanding of an utterance is related to the recognition of speaker’s intention. Searle objects to Grice that he doesn’t tie the recognition of meaning of an utterance with the recognition of intention. We challenge Searle’s objection by using schema 1 (p. 43). which shows that the recognition of utterance relies on the recognition of speaker′s meaning and intention. The notion of intention is analyzed in relation to the following theories: philosophical pragmatics (Grice, Recanati), psychological pragmatics (Sperber & Wilson) and linguistic communication (Kent Bach). We find out that Bach′s notion of referential intention is similiar to Grice′s notion of reflexive communicative intention. The referential intention is a part of the communicative intention, by which we are enabled to pick out the object of reference...