Jugoslovenska politika prema zemljama narodne demokratije u susedstvu : 1953-1958. godine
Yugoslav policy towards the neighboring countries of people's democracy 1953-1958
Author
Cvetković, Vladimir Lj
Mentor
Dimić, LjubodragCommittee members
Ristović, MilanRadojević, Mira
Bogetić, Dragan
Radić, Radmila

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Doktorska disertacija Jugoslovenska politika prema zemljama narodne
demokratije u susedstvu 1953 – 1958. godine zasnovana je na jugoslovenskim arhivskim
izvorima iz Arhiva Srbije i Crne Gore, Diplomatskog arhiva Ministarstva spoljnih poslova
Republike Srbije i Vojnog arhiva kao i na relevantnoj domaćoj i stranoj literaturi. Disertacija se
bavi jugoslovenskom politikom prema Albaniji, Bugarskoj, Rumuniji i Mađarskoj u periodu
normalizacije odnosa Jugoslavije sa ovim zemljama posle Staljinove smrti tj. posle
petogodišnjeg perioda tokom koga su njihovi odnosi bili u gotovo potpunom prekidu. Ona
predstavlja pokušaj da se sagleda odnos Jugoslavije prema neposrednom susedstvu u uslovima
hladnog rata i sadejstva jugoslovenskih interesa sa jedne i spoljnih faktora poput uloge
Sovjetskog Saveza u procesu normalizacije odnosa Jugoslavije sa pomenutim zemljama ili uloge
vodećih zapadnih zemalja i njihovih interesa u Jugoslaviji i susednim zemljama „narodne
demokratije“ sa druge strane. U nekoliko... faza kroz koje su od marta 1953. do aprila 1958.
godine prošli odnosi Jugoslavije sa Albanijom, Bugarskom, Rumunijom i Mađarskom (od
Staljinove smrti do potpisivanja Beogradske deklaracije, od potpisivanja Beogradske deklaracije
do XX kongresa KPSS-a, od XX kongresa KPSS-a do izbijanja događaja u Mađarskoj 1956.
godine i od događaja u Mađarskoj do kritike novog Programa SKJ) jugoslovenska politika se
menjala u skladu sa okolnostima zadržavajući kao konstante izražen interes za normalizaciju
odnosa i insistiranje na tome da sve susedne zemlje „narodne demokratije“ javno osude svoju
raniju politiku prema Jugoslaviji i rehabilituju sve koji su na montiranim sudskim procesima
osuđeni zbog špijunske delatnost u korist Jugoslavije.
Osnovni cilj rada na ovoj dioktorskoj disertaciji je bio da pruži nova znanja o ovoj temi,
nove poglede na jugoslovensku spoljnu politiku i ponudi novi ugao gledanja na odnose
Jugoslavije sa SSSR-om i Varšavskim paktom u celini. U vezi sa tim definisan je i drugi cilj
ovog rada koji se odnosi na rekonstrukciju jugoslovenske politike prema ovim zemljama i na
pokušaj da se uoče specifičnosti, metode i ciljevi te politike koji su se razlikovali u odnosu na
jugoslovensku politiku prema ostalim istočnoevropskim zemljama. Treći cilj na temu
jugoslovenske politike prema susednim zemljama „narodne demokratije“ od 1953. do 1958.
godine bio je i sistematizacija postojećih znanja o ovoj temi i njihova evaluacija s obzirom na
veći stepen dostupnosti izvora nego što je to bio
slučaj pre više decenija kada su nastali najznačajniji radovi koji su se delimično bavili pojedinim
segmentima ove teme. Četvrti cilj istraživanja bio je utvrđivanje hronološki jasno određenih faza
kroz koje su prolazili odnosi Jugoslavije sa Mađarskom, Rumunijom, Bugarskom i Albanijom u
posmatranom periodu i identifikacija faktora koji su na to uticali.
U trenutku Staljinove smrti, susedne zemlje „narodne demokratije“ bile su daleko od
centra pažnje jugoslovenske spoljne politike jer je , između ostalog, i njihov značaj za nju u
uslovima prekida međudržavnih odnosa bio mali. Međutim, promene koje su ubrzo posle
Staljinove smrti usledile u Sovjetskom Savezu omogućile su početak normalizacije odnosa
Jugoslavije i „prve zemlje socijalizma“ što je za sobom povuklo i mogućnost da Jugoslavija
normalizuje svoje odnose i sa susednim zemljama „narodne demokratije“. Kada su u pitanju bile
te zemlje, primarni jugoslovenski interes nije se nalazio u sferi politike i ekonomije kao u slučaju
Sovjetskog Saveza već u sferi praktičnih međudržavnih pitanja koja su teško opterećivala
Jugoslaviju.
Na prvom mestu to je bio interes da se što pre otkloni vojna pretnja na granicama i stanje
na zajedničkoj „liniji razgraničenja“ koje je u godinama posle 1948. iziskivalo velika materijalna
i kadrovska ulaganja. Osim toga, Jugoslavija je jasan interes imala i po pitanju poboljšanja
položaja pripadnika jugoslovenskih manjina u susednim zemljama „narodne demokratije“ kao i
po pitanju normalizacije saobraćaja. Razlog što Jugoslavija nije pokazivala izražen interes za
političku i ekonomsku saradnju sa ovim zemljama ležao je u činjenici da je ona u međuvremenu,
u vreme godina sukoba, uspela da pronađe alternativu kako u sferi spoljne politike tako i u sferi
ekonomije i na taj način obesmisli blokadu kojoj je bila izložena sa Istoka. Međutim, cena
iznalaženja te alternative bila je visoka i pretila je da ugrozi monopol vlasti Saveza komunista
Jugoslavije što je za Tita i njegovo najbliže okruženje bilo neprihvatljivo. Iz tog razloga,
mogućnost da se nađe zajednički jezik sa Moskvom predstavljao je za Tita priliku da uspostavi
ravnotežu kada je u pitanju bio jugoslovenski položaj prema suprotstavljenim blokovima u
zaoštrenoj hladnoratovskoj atmosferi.
Odnos Jugoslavije prema SSSR-u, i obrnuto, može se smatrati jednim od najznačajnijih
faktora koji su uticali na oblikovanje jugoslovenske politike prema susednim zemljama „narodne
demokratije“ sa jedne i na kreiranje politike koje su sve istočnoevropske zemlje vodile prema
Jugoslaviji sa druge strane. Drugi značajan faktor koji je uticao na jugoslovensku politiku prema
zemljama „narodne demokratije“ u susedstvu od 1953. do 1958. godine bio je u tesnoj vezi sa
jugoslovensko-sovjetskim odnosima a ticao se prevashodno ideologije i s tim u vezi
destaljinizacije. Kreirajući u godinama sukoba sa Informbiroom sopstveni model
„samoupravnog“ socijalizma, Jugoslavija tokom procesa normalizacije odnosa nije pristajala na
„jedinstvo lagera“ i povratak u njega što je bio glavni kamen spoticanja u njenim odnosima
kakao sa SSSR-om tako i sa drugim istočnoevropskim zemljama pa i susednim kao što su bile
Albanija, Bugarska, Mađarska i Rumunija. S tim u vezi je i destaljinizacija, odnosno njen
napredak i dubina u susednim „zemljama“ narodne demokratije kao i njihova spremnost da se
distanciraju od staljinističke ideologije, predstavljala jedan od glavnih faktora koji su uticali na
oblikovanje jugoslovenske politike prema tim zemljama. Najzad, važan činilac koji je uticao na
jugoslovensku spoljnu politiku uopšte pa i na njenu politiku prema delu ili celini Istočnog bloka
bili su i njeni odnosi sa Zapadom, koji su iz pragmatičnih razloga tokom godina sukoba sa
Informbiroom bili poboljšani do te mere da su Jugoslaviju, iako nevoljno, doveli na rub
uključenja u zapadni vojni savez. Zapad je bio taj kome se nije dopadalo jugoslovensko
približavanje SSSR-u i istočnoevropskim zemljama i u periodu normalizacije njihovih odnosa
svaki korak koji je vodio približavanju dveju do tada suprotstavljenih strana izazivao je na
Zapadu sumnje u iskrenost Jugoslavije i zebnju kada je u pitanju bila budućnost odnosa Zapada i
Jugoslavije.
Kao rezultat sadejstva nekoliko najvažnijih spoljnih faktora i jugoslovenskih interesa u
neposrednom susedstvu iz okvira socijalističkog „lagera“ nastajala je jugoslovenska politika
prema Istoku uopšte pa i prema Albaniji, Bugarskoj, Rumuniji i Mađarskoj ponaosob, onakva
kakva je bila. U periodu od 1953. do 1958. godine ta politika je bila aktivna i pozitivna ali ne i
bez ograda. Tih godina, Jugoslavija je bez sumnje pokazivala interes da normalizuje svoje
odnose sa susedima sa kojima je osim granice delila i ideologiju ali najčešće nije želela da ona
bude ta koja će dati inicijativu za konkretne korake u tom procesu. Smatrajući da su međusobni
odnosi narušeni ne njenom već krivicom suseda, ona je strogo poštovala načelo (koje je inače
zastupala i kada je u pitanju bila njena politika prema SSSR-u) da prvi korak treba da učini onaj
koji je odgovoran za prekid normalnih dobrosusedskih odnosa.
Imajući u vidu sve interese, želje i aspiracije koje je Jugoslavija imala kada je u pitanju
bio prostor neposredno uz njene granice kao i faktore koji su neminovno uticali na njenu
politiku, može se reći da je Jugoslavija prema zemljama „narodne demokratije“ u susedstvu u
periodu normalizacije međusobnih odnosa od 1953. do 1958. godine vodila politiku mogućeg.
Ta politika, međutim, iako osmišljena na isti način, nije uvek bila ista prema svakoj pojedinačnoj
zemlji u susedstvu iz prostog razloga što u njima nije nailazila na istovetne uslove i mogućnosti.
Tamo gde su mogućnosti bile veće, Jugoslavija je postizala više. Međutim, kako je vreme
odmicalo i kako je Jugoslavija bivala sve uspešnija u pronalaženju svog sopstvenog „trećeg
puta“, čini se da joj je sve manje i manje bilo stalo do sadržajnije saradnje sa većinom suseda
od kojih je (budući da su sve bile deo Istočnog bloka), u skladu sa svojom novom
spoljnopolitičkom strategijom koja je ekvidistancu prema blokovima predviđala kao imperativ,
trebalo da napravi određeni otklon.
The Ph.D. thesis Yugoslav Policy Towards the Neighboring Countries
of People’s Democracy 1953-1958 is based on Yugoslav archival sources from the Archives of
Yugoslavia, the Diplomatic Archives of the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Serbia and the
Military Archives, as well as on the relevant domestic and foreign literature. The thesis deals
with Yugoslav policy towards Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary during the period of
normalization of relations between these countries and Yugoslavia after Stalin’s death, i.e. after a
five years’ period of almost complete interruption in bilateral relations. It is an attempt at a study
of the interplay of Yugoslavia’s relations with immediate neighborhood during the Cold War and
Yugoslav interests on the one hand, and interests of foreign factors, such as the Soviet Union and
the leading Western nations in Yugoslavia and in the neighboring countries within the
framework of the normalization of Yugoslavia’s relations with the above mention...ed countries.
During the several phases the Yugoslav relations with Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary
went through between March 1953 and April 1958 (from Stalin’s death until the signing of the
Belgrade Declaration, from then to the 20th congress of the CP of the USSSR, from then until the
beginning of the events in Hungary in 1956 and from then until the critique of the new Program
of the CP of Yugoslavia), the Yugoslav policy changed in accordance with the situation,
preserving the interest in normalizing relations and insisting that all neighboring countries of
“people’s democracy” should condemn their former policy towards Yugoslavia and rehabilitate
all those who had been sentenced as Yugoslav spies at show trials.
The main goal of this Ph.D. thesis was to provide new knowledge of the topic, new views
on Yugoslav foreign policy and to propose a new vantage point on the Yugoslav relations with
the Soviet Union, and on relations with the Warsaw Pact as a whole. Connected with this was
another goal of the thesis that concrens the reconstruction of Yugoslav policy toward these
countries and the attempt to pinpoint the characteristics, methods and goals of that policy that
were different from those of Yugoslav policy toward other east European countries. The third
goal of the topic of Yugoslav policy toward the neighboring countries of „people’s democracy“
between 1953 and 1958 was also to systematize the existing knowledge on the subject in view of
better accessability of sources as compared with the situation of several decades ago when the
most important works touching upon some aspects of this topic were written. The fourth goal of
the research was to determin chronologically clearly defined phases that the Yugoslav relations
with Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania had gone through during the researched period
and to identify the factors that influenced the process.
At the time of Stalin’s death the countries of „people’s democracy“ were far from the
focus of the Yugoslav foreign policy, because, among other things, their importance was small
due to the severed inter-state relations. However, the changes that set in the Soviet Union soon
after Stalin’s death made the beginning of normalization of relations with the „first country of
socialism“ possible. This entailed the possibility that Yugoslavia also normalizes its relations
with neighboring countries of „people’s democracy“. When these countries were in question,
Yugoslavia’s primary interest didn’t lie in political or economic spheres as in the case of the
Soviet Union, but rather in the sphere of practical inter-state matters weighting heavily on
Yugoslavia.
Supreme was the interest to do away as soon as possible with the military threat on the
borders and to change the situation on the „line of demarcation“ that had required much material
and human resources in the years after 1948. Furthermore, Yugoslavia had a clear interest in
improving the situation of members of Yugoslav minorities in the neighboring countries of
„people’s democracy“, as well as in normalization of trafic. The reason why Yugoslavia showed
no great interest in political or economic cooperation with these countries lay in the fact that she
had in the meantime, during the years of conflict, found alternative solutions in the spheres of
foreign policy and economy, reducing thus to insignifficance the blocade imposed on her from
the East. However, the price of that alternative solution was high and it threatened to endanger
the power monopoly of the Union of the Communists of Yugoslavia, which was unacceptable for
Tito and his innermost circle of collaborators. For that reason, the possibility of finding common
grounds with Moscow was for Tito an oportunity to balance Yugoslavia’s position between the
two competing blocs in a worsened Cold War atmosphere.
Yugoslavia’s relation to the USSSR and vice versa, can be seen as one of the most important
factors influencing Yugoslav policy toward the neighboring countries of „people’s democracy“
on the one hand, and on the other, one that was decisively shaping their policy towards
Yugoslavia. Another important factor influencing Yugoslav policy toward the countries of
„people’s democracy“ in the vicinity between 1953 and 1958 was closely connected with the
Yugoslav-Soviet relations and it concerned primarily ideology and, in that context,
destalinization. Having created her own model of „self-managing“ socialism during the years of
conflict with the Cominform, during the process of normalization Yugoslavia didn’t accept the
unity of the Eastern Bloc and the matter of her return to it was one of the main stumbling blocks
both in her relations with the USSR and with the neighbors such as Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary
and Romania. In that context, destalinisation, i.e. its progress and depth in the neighboring
countries of „people’s democracy“ and their willingnes to distance themselves from the Stalinist
ideology was one of the major factors influencing Yugoslavia’s policy toward those countries.
Finally, the important factor influencing Yugoslav foreign policy in general, including part of
the Eastern Block or it as a whole, were Yugoslavia’s relations with the West that had been so
improved during the years of conflict with the Cominform, that they led Yugoslavia, although
unwillingly, to the brink of joining the western military alliance. The West was unhappy with
Yugoslav rapprochement with the USSR and eastern European countries and every step that
brought closer the two once confonted parties during the process of normalization of their
relations, caused the West to doubt Yugoslavia’s sincerety and cause fears for the future relations
between the West and Yugoslavia.
As a result of interplay of several major foreign political factors and Yugoslav interests in the
imediate socialist block neighborhood, the Yugoslav policy toward the East in general and
toward Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary individually, emerged in the given form.
Between 1953 and 1958 that policy was active and positive, but not without restrains. During
those years Yugoslavia clearly showed interest in normalizing her relations with the neighboring
countries with whom she shared not only borders, but ideology too, but in most cases she was
not willing to be the one to initiate concrete steps in that process. Deeming that it had not been
her fault but that of her neighbors that the bilateral relations had been spoiled, she observed
strictly the principle (that she also championed in her relations with the USSR) that the side that
had been responsible for the interruption of normal good neighborly relations should also make
the first move. Having in mind all the interests, wishes and aspirations that Yugoslavia had
concerning the space imediatly bordering on her territory as well as the factors necessarily
infuencing her policy, it can be said that Yugoslavia led the policy of what was possible toward
the neighboring countries of „people’s democracy“ during tthe period of normalization of
bilateral relations 1953-1958. However, that policy wasn’t always the same toward all these
neighboring countries, for simple reason that it didn’t meet with the same conditions and
possibilities in them. Where possibilities were greater, Yugoslavia acheived more. However, as
the time went by and as Yugoslavia became increasingly more successful in finding her own
„third way“, it seems she was increasingly less interested in substantial cooperation with most of
the neighbors from whom (since they were all members of the Eastern Block) certain distance
should be kept – in keeping with the new foreign political strategy that foresaw equidistance
towards both blocs as a must.