Protivčinjeničke verovatnoće
Counterfactual probability
Author
Filipović, Nenad D.
Mentor
Đorđević, Vladan Z.Committee members
Jovanović Kozlovski, Radmila
Jandrić, Andrej

Ćirković, Milan M.

Metadata
Show full item recordAbstract
Postoji pojam verovatnoće koji se koristi u determinističkim sistemima, poput bacanja
novčića, ali ostaje puno pitanja kako tačno shvatiti taj pojam. Cilj ovog istraživanja je pružanje
argumenata da taj pojam treba razumeti kao protivčinjeničku verovatnoću. Da bismo opravdali ovakav
zaključak, napravićemo nekoliko glavnih koraka u istraživanju. Prvo, analiziraćemo poznate istorijske i
moderne interpretacije objektivnog pojma verovatnoće. Ova analiza će služiti da istaknemo mane i
vrline bitnih radova u filozofiji verovatnoće, i da pokažemo da učenjem od prethodnika možemo da
dođemo do određenog zaključka oko toga kakva interpretacija verovatnoće treba da bude. Tvrdiću da
nam ti zaključci favorizuju protivčinjeničku interpretaciju verovatnoće, čije je osnove izneo Džon
Bigelou. Predložiću modifikaciju njegove teorije. Drugo, analiziraćemo najjače argumente za
inkompatibilizam objektivne verovatnoće i determinizma. Zaključićemo da je deo diskusije povodom
(in)kompatibilizma u filozofiji ...verovatnoće plod terminološke zbrke. Uz preciznije određenje
probabilističkih pojmova, pokazaćemo da ima razloga da prihvatimo kompatibilističku poziciju.
Najzad, analiziraćemo tri primera determinističkih sistema koji obiluju probabilističkim pojmovima:
klasičnu statističku mehaniku, evolutivnu biologiju, i igre šansi, i pokazati da postoje razlozi da se
probabilistički pojmovi u slučaju klasične statističke mehanike i igre šansi shvate kao protivčinjeničke
verovatnoće, a da u slučaju evolutivne biologije možemo poboljšati argumente Eliota Sobera ukoliko
prihvatimo protivčinjeničku interpretaciju
Certain notion of probability has been widely used in deterministic systems. However, lots of
open question remain about the exact meaning of the notion. The aim of this research is to argue that
the notion should be interpreted as counterfactual probability. To justify such a conclusion, we will
make several steps in the research. First, we will analyze major historical and modern interpretations of
the objective probability. This should serve to highlight both the flaws and virtues of famous ideas in
the field of philosophy of probability, and to show that by learning from the predecessors we can come
to some conclusions about what should be a good candidate for an interpretation of probability, i.e.
what are criteria for acceptable interpretation of probability. I will argue that these conclusions favor
the counterfactual interpretation of probability, originally proposed by John Bigelow. I will propose
modification of his theory, for some philosophical reasons. Second, we will anal...yze the strongest
arguments for incompatibilism of objective probabilities and determinism. We will conclude that at
least part of the long discussion regarding (in)compatibilsm in the philosophy of probability is the
result of a conceptual confusion. Using more precise probabilistic concepts, we will show that there are
reasons to accept compatibilsm. Finally, we will analyze three examples of deterministic systems
intertwined with probabilistic concepts: classical statistical mechanics, evolutionary biology, and games
of chance. We will show that there are reasons to interpret probability in the cases of classical statistical
mechanics and games of chance as counterfactual probability, and in the case of evolutionary biology,
we can refine Eliot Sober's arguments if we interpret probability as counterfactual probability