Problem svesti u filozofiji duha i psihoterapiji

Abstract

Svest je u poslednje tri decenije postala predmetom multidisciplinarnih studija svesti (consciousness studies), što je aktualizovalo značaj konceptualne analize pojma svesti i problema koji se javljaju u različitim istraţivačkim pristupima svesti. Da li različite discipline (pa čak i različiti pristupi u okviru iste discipline) govore uopšte o istom predmetu? Na šta se, na primer, odnose savremene neurološke teorije svesti, kakav teorijski status ima koncept svesti u okviru funkcionalnih dijagrama kognitivne psihologije, o čemu govore psihoterapeuti kada naglašavaju značaj svesnosti u psihoterapijskom procesu ili značaj osvešćivanja nesvesnog, šta imaju u vidu fenomenolozi ili praktičari kontemplativnih tradicija kada se bave neposrednim iskustvom i na kraju, šta pod svešću podrazumevaju različite ontološke pozicije o odnosu duha i tela? Konceptualna analiza koja je sprovedena u ovom radu ima za cilj poboljšanje komunikacije izmeĎu disciplina i lokalizaciju teškoća koje stoje na putu interdisciplinarnim istraţivačkim projektima. Analitička filozofija duha (philosophy of mind) je u poslednje četiri decenije izoštrila i locirala problematiku svesti, te razvila novi konceptualni aparat i misaone eksperimente koji omogućavaju preciznije razumevanje ograničenja u pokušaju prirodnonaučne rekonstukcije pojma duha (mind), kakvu su poslednjih decenija, inače sa velikim uspehom, preduzele tzv. mind sciences (poput kognitivne psihologije, veštačke inteligencije, lingvistike, neuronauke) . U radu autorka pokazuje kako različiti savremeni filozofi ukazuju na distinkcije dva lica svesti i duha – Dţekendofovo razlikovanje računarskog duha (computational mind) i fenomenološkog duha (phenomenological mind), Blokovo razlikovanje A-svesti (access consciousness) i P-svesti (phenomenal consciousness) i Čalmersovo razlikovanje „lakog“ i „teškog“ problema svesti. Dok se, na primer, A-svest, odnosi na svest u smislu pristupačnosti, odnosno dostupnosti odreĎenog sadrţaja (mentalne reprezentacije) u kontroli govora, rezonovanja i akcije, P-svest (fenomenalna svest) odnosi se na činjenicu da svesna mentalna stanja poseduju doţivljajne, kvalitativne odlike, koje su dostupne direktno jedino iz subjektivne perspektive prvog lica. Za ovaj aspekat svesti je filozofija duha uvela tehnički termin qualia (lat. sing. quale) i on čini svest drugačijom od ostalih predmeta istraţivanja u dominantnoj objektivističkoj naučnoj paradigmi. U radu autorka diskutuje problem ontološkog statusa qualia, kao problem u formulaciji materijalističkih teorija duha (teza o identitetu, funkcionalističke i reprezentacionalističke teorije), kao i epistemološke probleme qualia – problem spoznajno privilegovanog poloţaja, argument nepotpunog znanja (Dţekson) i problem eksplanatornog jaza (Levajn) i njihove reperkusije za filozofiju nauke – problem odnosa metodologije prvog i trećeg lica, razumevanja i objašnjenja, duhovnonaučnog i prirodnonaučnog pristupa čoveku. Iz ovog ugla je u novom svetlu sagledano istorijsko smenjivanje paradigmi u glavnim tokovima akademske psihologije. Sve dosadašnje strategije eliminacije fenomenalne svesti iz psihološkog i filozofskog diskursa vode produbljavanju jaza izmeĎu sveta iskustva (Lebenswelt, Huserl) i prirodnonaučne slike sveta izgraĎene primenom objektivne metodologije. Psihoterapija je, naprotiv, disciplina koja predstavlja jednu od najvaţnijih spona izmeĎu disciplinovanog pristupa subjektivnom iskustvu i objektivnih naučnih činjenica. Zato je paţnja posvećena savremenom konstitusanju psihoterapije kao naučne discipline, kao i njenom pozicioniranju u odnosu na prirodnonaučnu i duhovnonaučnu paradigmu od osnivanja (Frojdovog osciliranja izmeĎu naklonosti prirodnonaučnom modelu i hermeneutičke prakse), preko niza novina i „dekonstrukcija“ prvobitnog modela kroz njenu istoriju, do savremenog trenda – neuropsihoterapije, koja poslednjih deset godina uvodi nova saznanja neuronauke u sagledavanje psihoterapijskog procesa i unapreĎenje postupaka. Analizirani su značaj i uloga koju različiti psihoterapijski pravci (klasična psihoanaliza, BT, KBT, uključujući i nove mindfulness pristupe, egzistencijalistički, humanistički i konstruktivistički pravci) pridaju svesti, svesnosti i osvešćivanju, te koje značenje ovi pojmovi imaju u svetlu distinkcija na koje je ukazala analiza filozofije duha – reprezentaciono tj. funkcionalno-kauzalno i fenomenalno. Pokazano je i kako se epistemološki problemi svesti koji su ranije opisani pojavljuju i rešavaju u psihoterapiji kao praktičnoj disciplini. Integracija fenomenalne svesti u sliku duha, te povezivanje prirodnonaučnih disciplina i disciplina koje se bave iskustvom i subjektivnošču mora da poĎe dalje od konceptualno-logičke analize na kojoj ostaje filozofija duha. Prvi korak na tom putu je razvoj metodologije prvog lica, koja omogućava opis mentalnih procesa i sadrţaja onako kako se oni manifestuju iz ugla svesnog subjekta. Stoga je najpre prikazano šest metoda prvog lica poreklom iz introspektivne psihologije, fenomenološke filozofije i budističke kontemplativne tradicije, a zatim sprovedena tematska kvalitativna analiza ovih metoda. Postupkom otvorenog kodiranja izdvojeno je deset dimenzija po kojima su uporeĎivane metode. Ovo eksplorativno istraţivanje omogućilo je precizniji uvid u meĎusobne srodnosti i razlike analiziranih metoda, u njihove moći i slabosti, te strategije unapreĎenja, kao i u mogućnosti saradnje sa metodama trećeg lica. Pokazali smo takoĎe da „pogled iznutra“ moţe da otkrije vaţne odlike svesti i duha koji ostaju netransparentni objektivnim metodama.

Consciousness has become the subject of multidisciplinary consciousness studies in last three decades which revived the importance of conceptual analysis of the concept of consciousness and problems that occur in a variety of research approaches to consciousness. Do different disciplines (and even different approaches within the same discipline) speak about the same subject at all? What are modern neurological theories of consciousness related to, for example, what is the theoretical status of the concept of consciousness within functional diagrams of cognitive psychology, what do psychotherapists talk about when they highlight importance of awareness in a psychotherapeutic process and importance of becoming aware of the unconscious, what do phenomenologists or practitioners of contemplative traditions have in mind when dealing with direct experience and, in the end, what do different ontological positions imply with the notion of consciousness in the relationship between mind and body? Conceptual analysis conducted in this paper aims to improve communication between disciplines and localize difficulties that stand in the way of interdisciplinary research projects. Analytic philosophy of mind has sharpened and located the problem of consciousness in last four decades, and has also developed a new conceptual apparatus and thought experiments that enable more accurate understanding of limits in an attempt of a natural science reconstruction of the concept of mind, which in recent decades, usually with large success, have been undertaken by so-called mind sciences (such as cognitive psychology, artificial intelligence, linguistics, neuroscience). In this thesis, the author shows how different contemporary philosophers suggest distinctions of two faces of consciousness and mind – Jackendoff’s distinction between computational mind and phenomenological mind, Block’s differentiation of A-consciousness (access consciousness) and P-consciousness (phenomenal consciousness) and Chalmers’ distinction between "easy" and "hard" problems of consciousness. While, for example, A-consciousness, refers to consciousness in terms of accessibility and availability of specific content (mental representations) in the control of speech, reasoning and actions, P-consciousness (phenomenal consciousness) refers to the fact that conscious mental states possess experiential, qualitative characteristics, which are directly available only from the subjective perspective of the first person. Philosophy of mind introduced a technical term qualia (lat. sing. quale) for this aspect of consciousness, and it makes consciousness different from other subjects of research in the dominant objectivist scientific paradigm. In this thesis, the author discusses the problem of the ontological status of qualia, as a problem in the formulation of the materialistic mind theories (the thesis of identity, functionalist and representational theories), as well as epistemological problems of qualia - the problem of privileged access, the argument of incomplete knowledge (Jackson) and the problem of the explanatory gap (Levine) and their repercussions on philosophy of science - the problem of the relationship between first and third-person methodologies, understanding and explanation, a human science and a natural science approach to man. The historical succession of paradigms in the mainstream academic psychology has been viewed from this angle. All previous strategies of eliminating phenomenal consciousness from psychological and philosophical discourse lead to deepening of the gap between the world of experience (Lebenswelt, Husserl) and the natural science picture of the world constructed by using an objective methodology. Psychotherapy, on the contrary, is a discipline that is one of the most important links between a disciplined approach to subjective experience and objective scientific facts. That is why attention has been paid to the contemporary constitution of psychotherapy as a scientific discipline, as well as its positioning in relation to a natural science and a human science paradigm since its establishment (Freudian oscillating between the affection to natural scientific model and hermeneutical practice), through a number of novelties and "deconstructions" of the original model through its history, to the modern trend – neuropsychotherapy which has introduced new findings of neuroscience in understanding psychotherapeutic processes and improvement of procedures in last ten years. We analyzed the importance and the role that different psychotherapeutic views (classical psychoanalysis, BT, CBT, including new mindfulness approaches, existentialist, humanistic and constructivist views) attach to consciousness, awareness, and raising awareness, as well as the meanings of these terms in the light of distinctions identified by the analysis of philosophy of mind - that is, representational, functional-causal, and phenomenal. It was shown how the epistemological problems of consciousness described above occur and get resolved in psychotherapy as a practical discipline. Integration of phenomenal consciousness into an image of the mind, and connection of natural science disciplines and disciplines which deal with experience and subjectivity has to go beyond a conceptual and logical analysis on which philosophy of mind remains. The first step on this road is development of a first-person methodology, which allows a description of mental processes and content as they are manifested from a perspective of a conscious subject. Therefore, the first things presented were six first-person methods originating from introspective psychology, phenomenological philosophy and Buddhist contemplative tradition, and then, a qualitative thematic analysis of the six methods was conducted. The process of open coding singled out ten dimensions by which methods were compared. This exploratory research has allowed for a more precise insight into mutual similarities and differences of the analyzed methods, into their powers and weaknesses, improvement strategies, as well as opportunities for cooperation with third-person methods. It has shown also that “a view from within" can reveal important features of consciousness and mind that remain non-transparent to objective methods.