Odnos stvarnosti i fikcije u prozi Džonatana Svifta

Abstract

Rad se bavi odnosima stvarnosti i fikcije u prozi Džonatana Svifta. Teorijsko polazište rada predstavlja fikcionalna semantika Lubomira Doležela, dok su Guliverova putovanja uzeta za najparadigmatičniji Sviftov tekst. Iako Doleželova teorija predstavlja gotovo koherentnu celinu, posebno u pogledu nadgradnje pojma alternativnih mogućih svetova koji je stvorila analitička filozofija, u korelaciji s tekstovima poput Sviftovih otkrivaju se njene manjkavosti. Jedan od ciljeva rada stoga je i unapređenje Doleželove teorije kako bi odgovorila zahtevima fikcionalnih svetova satire i parodije, odnosno priznala kontekstualnost i kotekstualnost kao imanentne ovako ustrojenim fikcionalnim tvorevinama. Eksperimentalno sučeljavanje Sviftovih i Doleželovih tekstova dovodi do novih zaključaka po pitanju odnosa stvarnosti i fikcije, referencijalnosti u književnosti, ali i problema književne istine. Centralni zaključak rada sadržan je u tezi o mogućnosti svođenja ma kog fikcionalnog sveta na istinitost. Rad promoviše ideju o matičnom identitetu teksta kao isključivom izvorištu istine fikcije. Svaki matični identitet teksta u sebi sadrži neograničen broj autentičnih fikcionalnih identiteta, koji su zasnovani u većem broju fikcionalnih svetova. U slučaju Guliverovih putovanja pokazalo se da, nasuprot Doleželu, koji negira učešće činjenične istine u fikciji, fikcionalni svetovi satire zahtevaju referenciju u spoljašnjem svetu, fikcionalni svetovi parodije zahtevaju referenciju u prototekstu (prvenstveno globalnom žanrovskom obrascu putopisne proze), te da fikcionalne svetove ironije nije moguće konstituisati, jer ironijsko svojstvo kontinuirano insistira na narušavanju svakog vida istinitosti, a samim tim i opcije svetovnosti. Aplikacija delimično izmenjenih Doleželovih ideja na Sviftovu prozu pokazuje kako se pojam stvarnog sveta javlja kao nužno polazište svake teorije mogućih svetova, samim tim i onih koji nose oznaku fikcionalnih. U slučaju matičnih identiteta teksta kojima dominiraju fikcionalni svetovi satire ovu vezu uzrokuje njena priroda, dok opšta nužnost prisustva pojmovnosti stvarnog sveta zaustavlja prodor u ne-zamislivo.

This research deals with relationships between reality and fiction in Jonathan Swift’s prose. The theoretical starting point is Lubomír Doležel’s fictional semantics, and Gulliver’s Travels is taken as Swift’s most paradigmatic text. Although Doležel’s theory is an almost coherent whole, particularly with regard to the superimposition of the concept of alternative possible worlds created by analytical philosophy, its deficiencies are discerned in correlation with such texts as Swift’s. Therefore, one of the aims of this research is an improvement of Doležel’s theory so it can address the requirements of fictional worlds of satire and parody, and acknowledge contextuality and co-textuality as immanent in thus conceived fictional creations. An experimental confrontation of Swift’s and Doležel’s texts leads to new conclusions in terms of relationships between reality and fiction, referentiality in literature, and the problem of literary truth. The thesis of the possibility of reducing any fictional world to truth constitutes the central conclusion of this research. This research advances an idea of the parent identity of a text as the exclusive source of the truth of fiction. Any parent identity of a text inherently comprises an infinite number of authentic fictional identities which are based in a number of fictional worlds. In the case of Gulliver’s travels it transpires that, contrary to Doležel, who negates any existence of factual truth in fiction, fictional worlds of satire require reference in the outside world, fictional worlds of parody require reference in a prototext (primarily the global genre form of travel writing), and fictional worlds of irony cannot be constituted, since the ironical characteristic continually insists on the violation of any kind of truth, and thus the option of worldliness. The application of partially altered Doležel’s ideas to Swift’s prose shows that the concept of the real world appears as a necessary starting point of any theory of possible worlds, consequently also those designated as fictional. In the case of the parent identity of a text dominated by fictional worlds of satire, this relation is caused by its nature, whereas the general necessity of the presence of real world conceptuality prevents any advance into the inconceivable.